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Abstract 
Depression is a common and devastating instance of ill-being which 
deserves an account. Moreover, the ill-being of depression is impacted by 
digital technology: some uses of digital technology increase such ill-being 
while other uses of digital technology increase well-being. So a good 
account of ill-being would explicate the antecedents of depressive 
symptoms and their relief, digitally and otherwise. This paper borrows a 
causal network account of well-being and applies it to ill-being, particularly 
depression. Causal networks are found to provide a principled, coherent, 
intuitively plausible, and empirically adequate account of cases of 
depression in everyday and digital contexts. Causal network accounts of ill-
being also offer philosophical, scientific, and practical utility. Insofar as 
other accounts of ill-being cannot offer these advantages, we should prefer 
causal network accounts of ill-being. 
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1  Introduction 
Depression is not uncommon. Estimates suggest that major depressive 
disorder (MDD) affects more than 272 million people worldwide (Baxter et 
al., 2014, p. 509-510; US Census Bureau, 2011).  And the ill-being of 
depression is not an isolated phenomena; many other forms of ill-being are 
comorbid with depression (Avenevoli, Swendson, He, Burnstein, & 
Merikangas, 2015). So there is plenty of reason to understand instances of 
ill-being like depression. However, ill-being is complicated, making it 
difficult to capture the phenomena with a single account (Busseri & Mise, 
2019). 
This paper proposes that causal networks can account for ill-being. 
It will focus mainly on the instance of depression and digital technology’s 
role therein. The resources for this account of ill-being are borrowed from 
existing causal network accounts of well-being (Bishop, 2012, 2015). The 
present attempt will not amount to a complete account of ill-being, but it 
provides both a framework for a more complete account and as motivation 
to pursue the more complete account. Further, insofar as causal network 
accounts of ill-being complement existing causal network accounts of well-
being, the present causal network account can be instrumental in a 
comprehensive account of welfare, digital and otherwise. 
2  Causal Networks 
Causal networks have a few parts: nodes, relationships, and fragments. 
Further, one and the same effect can be produced by different causal 
networks. So a causal network account of ill-being will explain ill-being as 
a multiply realizable phenomena that is realized by—among other things—
nodes, relationships, and fragments. 
2.1  Parts Of Networks 
Nodes. A node represents a single variable which has some causal 
relationship(s) with other variables in a network. One variable that seems to 
be causally related to ill-being is socio-economic status (SES) (Headey, 
Holmström, & Wearing, 1984, 1985). So SES might be a node in ill-being 
networks. 
 Relationships. Nodes are connected to one or more other nodes in 
a network—these connections are often called “edges” in the literature on 
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causal modeling (e.g., Scheines, Spirtes, Glymour, Meek, & Richardson, 
1998). Nodes can have two kinds of connection with each other: 
promotional connections and inhibitory connections. Firstly, a node is in a 
promotional relationship with another node just in case an increase in the 
coefficient of the one node causes an increase in the coefficient of the other 
node. The promotional relationship is represented by the line ending with 
an arrow, as in Figure 1 (left), which represents an increase in SES causing 
an increase in self-esteem (ibid.). 
 
Figure 1. Promotional relationship (left) and inhibitory relationship (right). 
  
 
 Secondly, a node is in an inhibitory relationship with another node 
just in case an increase in the coefficient in one node results in a decrease 
in the coefficient in the other node. The inhibitory relationship is 
represented by the line ending with a diamond as in Figure 1 (right), which 
represents an increase in face-to-face social contact causing a decrease in 
loneliness (Kross et al., 2013). 
 Fragments. A fragment is a non-complete portion of a network. 
More precisely, a network fragment refers to two or more nodes (of a 
network containing more than two nodes) as well as the relationships 
between these nodes.  
2.2  Properties Of Causal Networks 
Multiple realizability. We can distinguish between higher-level 
and lower-level states and changes. Lower-level states or changes in a 
network refer to states or changes to the structure and dynamic of a network. 
Higher-level states or changes in a network refer to states or changes that 
emerge from lower-level states or changes. For example, lower-level 
changes in SES, face-to-face social contact, and loneliness will have an 
impact on higher level states of ill-being such as self-esteem.  
In this paper, “ill-being” refers to a higher-level phenomenon that 
emerges from the states and changes in the structure and dynamics of lower-
level networks, which will be called ill-being networks. Notably, higher-
level network states can be multiply realizable. That is, two or more 
different lower-level network states might correspond to one state of ill-
being.  
SES Self-esteem Face-to-face social contact Loneliness 
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Individuation. If ill-being is multiply realizable, then individuating 
different instances of ill-being will sometimes require individuating the 
differences in the causal networks from which they emerged.  Causal 
networks can be individuated by their structure and their dynamics.  
Two networks have different structure when they have different 
nodes and/or different connections between nodes. For example, a network 
with three nodes can be individuated from networks containing more or less 
than three nodes. Similarly, two networks with the same nodes can be 
individuated if they do not share all the same connections between their 
nodes. So the network fragments above have different structure because 
they have different nodes.  
Two networks have different dynamics when, all else being equal, 
the relationship between one network’s nodes are non-identical to the 
relationships between another network’s nodes. For instance, a network that 
contains only promotional relationships is distinct from a network of the 
same nodes that contains only inhibitory relationships. So the network 
fragments above have different dynamics because one has only a 
promotional relationship and the other has only an inhibitory relationship. 
3  A Causal Network Account of Ill-being 
With the basic resources of causal networks, we can begin to explain ill-
being. To focus the discussion, we will limit our scope to cases of 
depression and digital well-being.  
3.1  Causal Networks & Ill-being 
The first order of business is to point out that the overall dynamic of a causal 
network can be positive, negative, or neutral (Bishop 2015, p. 41). These 
dynamics determine whether the network is contributing to well-being or 
ill-being.  
 Causes of well-being and ill-being. A positive causal network is a 
network that inhibits ill-being or contributes to well-being (see also Bishop, 
2015, p. 10-11). Conversely, a negative causal network would either inhibit 
well-being or contribute to ill-being.  
Now consider ill-being. Ill-being involves many variables: feelings, 
beliefs, motivations, behaviors, habits, traits, abilities, goals, goal-
attainment, resources, and perhaps other variables. A causal network 
account of ill-being can represent these aspects of ill-being with nodes.  
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 Causal networks can also represent the relationships between 
variables. Ill-being involves many such relationships. For example, 
financial and social resources can causes changes in one’s feelings and 
attitudes (Headey, Holmström, & Wearing, 1985, p. 221). 
Robustness of well-being and ill-being. Also, causal networks can 
be more or less robust—where ‘robust’ refers to the resilience of a higher-
level network state in the face of lower-level network changes. One’s ill-
being network is more robust insofar as more interventions on (lower-level) 
states of the ill-being network produce fewer changes to one’s ill-being. 
Another way to say this is that the more one can change the structure and 
dynamic of the ill-being network without changing one's ill-being, the more 
robust their ill-being network is.  
 This notion of robustness implies that there will be (qualitative and 
quantitative) thresholds such that some threshold-breaking amount of 
change to the structure and/or dynamic of an ill-being network will result in 
a change in ill-being. In other words, once a threshold is broken, an 
otherwise robust negative causal network that was reinforcing ill-being 
might no longer reinforce ill-being. 
3.2  Depression & Rumination 
Some people are more likely than others to believe that their happiness is a 
function of goal-attainment. Interestingly this belief is related to numerous 
other variables like the proclivity to ruminate and the risk of depression 
(McIntosh, 1996, McIntosh, Harlow, & Martin, 1995; McIntosh & Martin, 
1992). 
 For illustration, consider two people: Lincoln and Jordan. Lincoln 
believes that happiness is linked to goal-attainment. Jordan doesn’t believe 
this. Like anyone might, when Lincoln or Jordan realize that they have 
attained a goal, they briefly experience a positive feeling. And when they 
realize that they have failed to reach a goal, they briefly experience a 
negative feeling. However, because Lincoln believes that happiness is 
linked to goal-attainment, whenever Lincoln realizes that they failed to 
reach a goal, Lincoln ruminates about this failure. And the more Lincoln 
ruminates, the more Lincoln feels negatively. Only when Lincoln stops 
ruminating can they continue trying to attain the same goal. So, unless 
Lincoln disengages or attains the goal, Lincoln might become stuck in a 
cycle of negative feelings. Jordan, however, is not so prone to ruminate 
about failing to attain a goal. After all, Jordan doesn’t believe that their 
  5 
happiness is related to attaining or failing to attain goals. So when Jordan 
fails to attain a goal, the effects are briefer and less negative. 
 In this example, one’s beliefs and habits turn out to be crucial to ill-
being. In this case, Lincoln has a belief about happiness and a habit of 
ruminating that Jordan didn’t have. Both are importantly related to other 
nodes in the ill-being network such that when Lincoln encounters certain 
scenarios, they are more prone to fall into a negative cycle of rumination 
and negative feelings (Figure 2). In network terminology, the dynamics of 
Jordan and Lincoln's causal networks varied as a function of at least two 
variables: a particular belief and a particular habit. 
Lincoln and Jordan are not alone. The effect of their beliefs about 
happiness and goal-attainment on their ill-being seems to be generalizable 
(McIntosh, 1996; McIntosh, Harlow, & Martin, 1995; McIntosh & Martin, 
1992). And the effect of their rumination is also generalizable since it is 
associated with being in longer and more severe bouts of depression 
following stressful circumstances (Beck, 1970a, 1970b, 1979a, 1979b, 
1991; Beck & Greenburg, 1984; Beck, 1995; Millar, Tesser, & Millar, 1988; 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). In fact, rumination has also been posited as the 
mechanism that explains why some depressive risk-factors result in 
depression and others do not (Spasojević & Alloy, 2001).  
From these details about beliefs, goals, rumination, and negative 
affect, we can begin to see how a causal network might account for the ill-
being of certain instances of depression. The causal network can also 
account for the self-reinforcing nature of certain instances of depression. 
Further, the causal network accounts for the difference in ill-being between 
two people that have similar experiences—e.g., similar goal-attainment. 
3.3 Depression & Learned Helplessness 
These self-reinforcing dynamics of negative causal networks are helpful in 
understanding further features of ill-being like robustness. Consider learned 
helplessness. Learned helplessness is induced when a person finds 
themselves in an undesirable or painful circumstance so often that the 
person loses the motivation to avoid said circumstances (Abramson, 
Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Maier & Seligman, 1976). Various 
investigations suggest that learned helplessness is a causal condition for 
depression (Peterson & Seligman, 1984). 
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 To illustrate how a certain negative causal network might lead to  
learned helplessness and thereby to depression, consider Jonsi. Jonsi 
believes—implicitly or explicitly—that their happiness is closely tied to 
excelling at work. So whenever Jonsi believes that they are doing poorly at 
work, Jonsi feels negatively. Further Jonsi has a habit of responding to 
negative feelings by ruminating on them, which leads to additional negative 
feelings. So doing poorly at work can quickly lead Jonsi’s into a downward 
emotional spiral, which might culminate in learned helplessness. And if 
Jonsi is experiencing learned helplessness, then Jonsi's motivation becomes 
No 
Reach goal? 
Able to disengage 
goal? 
Disengage 
from goal 
Continued 
Rumination + 
Negative Affect 
Yes Yes 
No 
Yes 
Reach goal? 
Focus On 
New Goal 
Momentary 
Negative 
Affect 
Momentary 
Positive 
Affect 
Negative 
Effect,  
Rumination 
Momentary 
Positive 
Affect 
Believe that goal-attainment 
leads to happiness? 
Reach goal? Reach goal? No Yes No Yes 
No 
Focus On 
New Goal 
No Yes 
Lincoln Jordan 
Figure 2. Two causal network fragments adapted from McIntosh (1996, p. 65, Figure 3.1) 
illustrating how the same events can produce different levels of well-being or ill-being 
depending on beliefs. 
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dangerously low. Some people can recover from this. They might, for 
example, have the resources to break the self-perpetuating cycle of 
rumination and negative effect by challenging the thoughts that are 
producing the negative feelings (e.g., cognitive-behavioral therapy) or by 
immersing oneself in experiences that supplant negative thoughts with 
neutral thoughts or positively valanced thoughts (e.g., a social gathering, a 
romantic evening, or an impromptu weekend getaway). But Jonsi doesn’t 
have the financial or social resources for these strategies. Jonsi is a single 
parent with insufficient financial or social resources to take a break from 
their near-constant work and child-care responsibilities. So Jonsi’s negative 
thoughts continue to reinforce their negative feelings and vice versa. In 
network terminology, the dynamic of Jonsi’s ill-being network is becoming 
increasingly negative and increasingly robust. Soon Jonsi seems to lack 
motivation entirely. Most days Jonsi cannot even bear to leave the house. 
This results in poor attendance at work, which increases Jonsi’s sense of not 
excelling at work. Eventually Jonsi’s absenteeism becomes too much for 
their employer and Jonsi loses their job. Naturally, this makes Jonsi feel 
worse than ever about work and so Jonsi loses all hope that things will get 
better and begins wondering whether life is still worth living.  
 What was just described is a robust negative network fragment 
(Figure 3). It will be familiar to those who have experienced or witnessed 
severe cases of depression. At first, the negative dynamics of this causal 
network fragment might have been weakened by modest disruptions to the 
network—e.g., by changing Jonsi's beliefs about their vocation, by 
interrupting rumination, and/or by allowing Jonsi to enjoy some time away 
from vocational or child-care responsibilities, etc. But eventually the causal 
network’s dynamic became increasingly negative and increasingly robust 
until modest interventions would no longer have an impact on Jonsi’s ill-
being. The network’s change thresholds were just too high for such modest 
changes to cause a higher-level change in ill-being. 
3.4  Implications For Ill-being 
The causal roles of rumination and learned helplessness in depression are, 
of course, empirical hypotheses subject to empirical testing. Nonetheless, 
insofar as these causal network fragments adequately capture ill-being 
dynamics, they have implications for well-being—including digital well-
being (Burr, Taddeo, & Floridi, forthcoming). 
  8 
Figure 3. Ill-being network fragment. 
 
 
 External nodes. Some nodes in Lincoln’s, Jordan’s, and Jonsi’s 
well-being network fragments are external. That is, they are not part of 
one’s body, one’s immediate environment, or even one’s domain of 
controllable factors (e.g., social resources, financial resources). This means 
that ill-being can depend on factors outside one’s control (Headey, 
Holmström, & Wearing, 1984, 1985). This is unsurprising. Loved ones die, 
accidents happen, economies crash, natural disasters occur, and so on. We 
usually cannot control these factors and yet can have significant impacts on 
our well-being. 
 Of course, institutions can control factors that many individuals 
cannot. So even if I cannot exert control over monetary, tax, and other 
policies, some institutions can. As such, some part of my well-being is 
decided by these institutions. Depending on the nature of responsibility, this 
might entail that such institutions are also responsible for some part of my 
well-being (Floridi, 2018). So causal network accounts of ill-being 
recommend investigation of potential institutional responsibilities for ill-
being.  
Digital ill-being. Some external factors are partially in our control. 
Consider digital technology. We can often choose how to use digital 
technology. Moreover, digital technology designers can often choose how 
to impact users well-being. 
social  
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No 
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Although some argue that digital technology is improving well-
being (Schwab, 2017), others are less sanguine. Indeed, the World Health 
Organization recently recommended that children limit the use of digital 
technology in order to limit its detrimental impact on well-being (2019). 
Indeed, one observational study of a nationally representative sample of 
over a million US adolescent students found that using digital technology 
predicted lower well-being (Twenge, Martin, & Campbell, 2018). More 
recent analyses suggest that using digital technology accounted for, at most, 
0.4% of the variance in well-being (Orben & Przybylski, 2019).  
The actual impact of digital technology on well-being is an 
empirical question. Still, insofar as we think that ill-being networks contain 
nodes pertaining to digital technology and we want to better predict and 
control ill-being, there is reason to investigate and intervene on the 
relationship(s) between digital technology and ill-being (Peters, Calvo, & 
Ryan, 2018).  
 Social networks. Some of the external nodes in a well-being or ill-
being network are people (or features of other people). In other words, our 
welfare is at least partially dependent on other people.  
There is some evidence that such social factors do influence our 
welfare. For instance, bullying predicts fewer friendships in early 
adolescence, which predicts depressive symptoms in later adolescence 
(Harmelen et al., 2016). Relatedly, family adversity in childhood predicts 
less family support in adolescence, which predicts greater depressive 
symptoms in later adolescence (ibid.).  
There is also evidence that digital social networks can influence our 
welfare. For instance, passively consuming information about people in our 
digital social network is linked to lower subjective well-being; conversely, 
actively broadcasting and exchanging information with people in our digital 
social network is linked to higher subjective well-being (Verduyn, Ybarra, 
Résibois, Jonides, & 2017).   
Insofar as these social factors impact well-being and we want to 
better predict and control ill-being, we should study how these social factors 
feature in ill-being networks. Fortunately, some psychologists are already 
employing such network analyses (Aalbers, McNally, Heeren, de Wit, & 
Fried, 2019). For instance, Faelens and colleagues’ (2019) correlational 
network analyses found that social comparison and self-esteem featured 
centrally in networks of Facebook use, rumination, depressive symptoms, 
and other factors (Figure 4).  
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Figure 4. Correlational networks (Faelens, Hoorelbeke, Fried, Raedt, & Koster, 2019, Study 2). 
COM-F = Comparison Orientation Measure-Facebook. CSE = contingent self-esteem. CSS = 
Contingent Self-Esteem Scale. FBI = Facebook Intensity Scale. MSFU = Multidimensional Scale of 
Facebook Use. RRS = Ruminative Responses Scale. RSES = Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale. SNS = 
Social networking sites. DASS. Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scales. 
 
 
  
Self-reinforcement. Causal networks also capture the self-
reinforcing nature of some kinds of ill-being. When something improves 
our mood, our better mood might thereby lift the moods of those round us. 
And this positive dynamic might be self-reinforcing. Alas, self-reinforcing 
dynamics can also be negative. When something puts us in a sour mood, we 
might thereby put others in a sour mood. All of this depends, of course, on 
how the nodes between various ill-being networks are related. 
3.5  Overview Of Causal Network Accounts Of Ill-being 
Causal networks offer a coherent, fruitful, and informative account of ill-
being. The risk and induction of, say, depression can be explained in terms 
of causal network dynamics. Moreover, the treatment-resistance of 
depression can be explained in terms of the robustness of causal networks. 
Causal network analysis can also capture how online and offline social 
factors can contribute to ill-being. Of course, this is only a sketch of a causal 
network account of ill-being. A more complete causal network account of 
ill-being would address more features and instances of ill-being. To 
understand why one should invest in a causal network account of ill-being, 
we should consider the potential benefits to philosophy, science, and 
everyday life. 
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4  Benefits Of Network Accounts Of Ill-being 
One metric of the success of an account or concept is its utility (e.g., Dutilh 
Novaes, 2018; Haslanger, 2012; Shepherd & Justus, 2015). Causal network 
accounts of ill-being offer philosophical, scientific, and practical utility. 
4.1  Philosophical Utility 
A causal network account of depression provides a framework for other 
forms of ill-being. Once other forms of ill-being are fit into a causal network 
account, we would have a complement to causal network accounts of well-
being (e.g., Bishop, 2015). Once causal networks account for both ill-being 
and well-being, it would seem that causal networks account for welfare 
more generally. In other words, a causal network account of ill-being might 
be instrumental in a complete account of welfare. This provides some 
motivation to explore the potential of causal network accounts of ill-being. 
Importantly, much of the grist for causal network accounts of ill-
being is scientific. Philosophers’ intuitions only take us so far. After all, 
when two intuitions conflict, we need a method for arbitrating between them 
(Bishop, 2015). One way to arbitrate between intuitions involves studying 
intuitions about ill-being as well as the psychological processes that produce 
these intuitions (Knobe & Nichols, 2007). So experimental philosophy 
could be crucial to the advancement of ill-being research.  
4.2  Scientific Utility 
Imagine that you’re deciding between two accounts of ill-being. Both 
accounts do well to capture our first-person experience and our intuitions 
about ill-being. But only one account unifies, makes sense of, and is useful 
to science. It seems that this latter account should be preferred to the account 
that offers only armchair purchase (Bishop, 2015; Kitcher, 1981; 
Woodward, 2014). There is some reason to think that a causal network 
account of ill-being is the second sort of account. Consider a range of 
evidence from science. 
Science generally. By identifying two variables and intervening on 
one—while controlling other variables—scientists reveal causal 
relationships between two variables (Woodward, 2003; Saatsi & Pexton, 
2013). And since causal networks represent variables (as nodes) and the 
causal connections between variables, a causal network account of ill-being 
stands to unify otherwise disparate studies of the variables involved in ill-
being. For example, suppose that some experiments find that using backlit 
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touchscreens in the evening disrupts circadian rhythms and other 
experiments find that disrupting circadian rhythms disrupts self-esteem. 
These otherwise disparate findings could be unified with a causal network 
with nodes referring to evening backlit touchscreen use, circadian rhythm, 
and self-esteem. 
Experimental psychology. Publications in experimental 
psychology about well-being are rife with causal models like the ones 
offered herein (Burnette, Davis, Green, Worthington, & Bradfield, 2009, p. 
277 Figure 1; Carnelly, Pietromo, & Jaffe, 1994, p. 129 Figure 1; Radecki-
Bush, Farrel, & Bush, 1993, pp. 573 Figure 1, 579 Figure 2, 580 Figure 3, 
582 Figure 4; Tasca et al., 2009, p. 665, Figures 1 and 2; Tse & Yip, 2009, 
p. 367, Figure 1). In fact, many of the causal models in the previous sections 
were adapted from the causal models of experimental psychologists. So it 
is no accident that the causal network account resembles this literature.  
Neuroscience. Exercise has been widely shown to relieve 
depressive symptoms (Blumenthal et al., 1999; Cooney, Kerry, & Gillian, 
2014; Kramer & Ericsson, 2007; Motl et al., 2005; Pedersen & Saltin, 2015; 
Schuch et al., 2016). And neuroscience is providing, in broad strokes at 
least, some clues about the causal network(s) that account for these positive 
outcomes. 
Exercise and regular physical activity seem to directly affect the 
brain in various ways. For instance, exercise and physical activity improve 
synaptic structure by improving potentiating synaptic strength (Cotman, 
Berchtold, & Christie, 2007), improve neural plasticity via neurogenesis 
(ibid.), increase glia density (Spielman, Little, & Klegeris, 2016), additional 
5-HT and dopamine (ibid.), additional astrocytes at the blood-brain barrier 
(ibid.), increase signals of both glutamate and GABA in the visual cortex 
(Maddock, Casazza, Fernandez, & Maddock, 2016), and increased signals 
of glutamate in the anterior cingulate cortex (ibid.). Effects like these are 
said to jointly cause “growth factor cascades” which improve overall “brain 
health and function” (Cotman, Berchtold, & Christie, 2007; Kramer & 
Ericsson, 2007).  
Exercise and physical activity also indirectly affect the brain. 
Generally speaking, “exercise reduces peripheral risk factors for cognitive 
decline” by preventing—among other things—neurodegeneration, 
neurotrophic resistance, hypertension, and insulin resistance (Cotman, 
Berchtold, & Christie, 2007; Prakash, Voss, Erickson, & Kramer, 2015). By 
preventing these threats to neural and cognitive health, exercise is indirectly 
promoting conditions for brain health and function. And all of these direct 
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and indirect effects of exercise and physical activity on the brain are 
associated with or causally related to significant reductions in depressive 
symptoms (Spielman, Little, & Klegeris, 2016, pp. 22-23, 25-26).  
 We can represent these direct and indirect effects of exercise and 
physical activity on depression with a causal network fragment (Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5. Exercise promotes outcomes in the brain that promote other positive outcomes outside the 
brain. Similarly, exercise reduces negatives outcomes that would reduce certain positive outcomes. 
This is adapted from causal network models from Cotman and colleagues’ (2007) work and includes 
details from a review by Spielman and colleagues (2016). 
 
 
 
Exercise is not the only intervention on the brain that matters. 
Randomized experiments find that stimulating and/or disrupting neural 
function in various subcortical regions of the brain (e.g., deep brain 
stimulation or DBS) led to significant and long-term reductions in 
depressive symptoms (Bewernick et al., 2010; Lozano et al., 2008; Mayberg 
et al., 2005).   
 All of these hypotheses about the brain’s relationship to cases of ill-
being like depression seem amenable to a causal network account. 
Admittedly, more research is needed to identify all of the causally relevant 
variables and precisify the causal dynamic(s) in the brain which underlie 
various forms of ill-being like depression.  
Economics. Economists and other social scientists also use causal 
networks to visualize their research on well-being. For example, it was 
economists who helped reveal that the effects of self-esteem and personal 
competence on health and overall welfare are partially accounted for by 
socioeconomic status (Headey, Holmström, and Wearing 1984, 1985). They 
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illustrated their findings with causal networks. They started with a relatively 
small network fragment (Figure 6), but soon found evidence of a larger 
network (Figure 7).  
 
Figure 6. Headey, Holstrom, & Wearing 1984, 129, figure 1. 
 
Figure 7. Headey, Holstrom, & Wearing 1985, 221, figure 1. 
 
 
Psychiatry. Causal network accounts of ill-being also appear in psychiatry 
(e.g., Cramer & Borsboom, 2015). Indeed, these accounts provide the 
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resources to make sense of why depressive symptoms are relieved more 
reliably and for longer periods of time by certain manipulations like 
cognitive therapy (Gloaguen, Cottraux, Cucherat, & Jordinburn. 1998; Ma 
& Teasdale, 2004; Wampold, Minami, Baskin, & Tierney, 2002), cognitive-
behavioral therapy (CBT) (Tolin, 2010), and electroconvulsive therapy 
(ECT) (Tor et al., 2015). In fact, it was the literature in psychiatry that 
inspired the story of Jordan and Lincoln. This literature suggests that—
among other things—CBT’s method of identifying and challenging certain 
negative, unhealthy, or even counterproductive beliefs can weaken negative 
causal network dynamics and thereby relieve depressive symptoms. These 
data suggest that—among other things—beliefs are part of many peoples’ 
ill-being networks. The data also suggest that reflecting on our beliefs can 
have psychiatric benefits.  
More recent meta-analysis have examined the efficacy of virtual 
versions of some of these therapies. They find that the virtual therapies are 
as effective as their non-virtual counterparts (Cheshman, Malouff, & 
Schutte, 2018). This is one way that digital technology can be part of the 
solution to various cases of ill-being. In causal network terminology, the 
nodes referring to therapy could involve in vivo or virtual therapy.  
Sports Medicine. Some have pointed out that eHealth technology 
might lead to greater adoption of physical activity regimens (Burr, 
Mariarosaria, & Floridi, under review). Some evidence supports this 
hypothesis. For instance, a pre-registered randomized controlled trial found 
that activity tracker use stemmed reductions in moderate-to-vigorous 
physical relative to a control group 6 months after the experiment ended 
(Finkelstein et al., 2016). Although activity tracking often improves 
physical activity and mobility—which might reduce ill-being in various 
ways—their effects on quality of life is not well understood (Oliveira, 
Sherrington, Zheng, Franco, & Tiedemann, 2019). Further research could 
clarify this part of causal networks involving activity, digital activity 
tracking, and well-being. 
Other Sciences. Other domains of science reveal additional details 
about the network of causes that account for forms of ill-being like 
depression. For instance, depression seems to be causally related to genetic 
variation (Okbay et al., 2016), genetic expression (Gujral, Manuck, Ferrell, 
Flory, & Ericsson, 2014), opioid activity (Hsu et al., 2015), and endogenous 
cytokine production (Müller et al., 2006).  
Correlational Studies. Some scientific findings about ill-being are 
correlational rather than causal. For instance, depressive symptoms 
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correlate with race (Weaver, Himle, Taylor, Matusko, & Ableson, 2015), 
urban (vs. suburban) residence (ibid.; see also Anderson, 2010), 
endogenous protein production (Kahndaker, Pearson, Zammit, Lewis, & 
Blanche, 2014), and vitamin D efficiency (Kerr et al., 2015). While 
correlational studies do not reveal causes, they reveal details which guide 
follow-up studies that might identify causes. So correlational studies are 
still amenable and instrumental to causal network accounts of ill-being and 
the science thereof. 
4.3  Practical Utility 
As philosophers continue to explicate the nodes in ill-being networks and 
scientists investigate their causal relationship to other nodes, we can better 
predict and control ill-being. Importantly, this philosophical and scientific 
work can be useful beyond philosophy and science. It can also serve 
ordinary people and institutions.   
Institutions. Consider how governments and businesses might 
make use of the insights of scientific interventions on ill-being. First, they 
might be able to inform and reform policies that reliably inhibit their 
constituents’ ill-being. Moreover, institutions might have the ability to 
intervene on nodes in people’s ill-being networks in ways that individuals 
cannot. Thus, individuals might be reliant on institutions for certain 
interventions on their ill-being. Given this relationship, one might wonder 
if institutions owe it to their constituents to understand the causal networks 
involved in ill-being and implement policy accordingly.  
Intervening on constituents’ ill-being networks need not be entirely 
altruistic. Indeed, institutions might find that they can nudge constituents 
toward greater well-being in mutually beneficial ways (Conly, 2012). For 
instance, businesses might find that returns on investments increase as a 
result of employer-subsidized ill-being interventions. Indeed, businesses 
might already be crunching these numbers (Hargrave & Hiatt, 2005; 
Hargrave, Hiatt, Alexander, & Schaffer, 2008; McLeod, 2010; McLeod & 
Mcleod, 2001; Stewart, Ricci, Chee, Hahn, & Morganstein, 2003).  
Individuals. Causal network accounts of ill-being can also deliver 
practical advice. Recall that various forms of physical activity, exercise, and 
therapy reliably inhibit certain forms of ill-being like depression and 
cognitive decline. It does not strain imagination to conceive of how people 
might use this knowledge to intervene on instances of ill-being. 
This raises questions about how to think about failures to learn from 
and apply causal network accounts of well-being. Are we personally 
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responsible for intervening on our own ill-being? Such universal 
responsibility seems difficult to defend. There are many reasons why we 
could know about interventions that will reliably inhibit our ill-being, fail 
to implement the intervention, and yet not be responsible (or blameworthy) 
for failing to implement these interventions—e.g., Jonsi’s case of learned 
helplessness.  
Nonetheless, our ill-being may have impacts on others’. So insofar 
as we have duties to not harm others’ well-being, we might have duties to 
limit our own ill-being or its impact on others. Causal network accounts 
need not commit to positions about personal responsibility. The point is just 
that causal networks provide resources for identifying or tracing 
responsibility between individuals (Dennett, 2015). 
5  Objections & Replies 
Causal network accounts of ill-being offer philosophical, scientific, and 
practical benefits. So causal network accounts should be preferred to 
accounts of ill-being that offer less than this. Nonetheless, the causal 
network theorist may encounter objections. Consider some objections 
related to normativity, triviality, intuitive appeal, and completeness. 
5.1 Normativity 
Some might complain that the causal network account of ill-being doesn’t 
actually capture what is bad about ill-being. It doesn’t account for why we 
should avoid ill-being and be concerned about others’ avoiding ill-being. In 
other words, the causal network account of ill-being does not meet the 
“normativity requirement” (Bishop, 2015, p. 198). 
 The normativity requirement has many forms. Michael Bishop 
offers five possible ways to interpret the normativity requirement and then 
explains why it is not clear that any of the interpretations of the requirement 
are devastating to the causal network account of well-being (2015, pp. 198-
207). Since the causal network account of ill-being is based, in large part, 
on Bishop’s causal network account of well-being, there is prima facie 
reason to think that Bishop’s responses to the normativity requirement apply 
to the present account of ill-being as well. So unless it becomes clear that 
the normativity requirement is uniquely devastating to the present account 
of ill-being, further responses to the normativity requirement need not be 
invented.  
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 So consider Bishop’s conclusion about normativity. First, we can 
agree on two outcomes: a causal network account either meets the 
normativity requirement or it doesn’t. If it does meet the requirement, then 
the complaint about normativity is moot. If it doesn’t meet the requirement, 
then there are at least two reasons why this failure might not be devastating: 
(a) the normativity requirement is illegitimate or (b) the normativity 
requirement is too controversial to constitute a universal requirement 
(Bishop, 2015, p. 207). So invoking the normativity requirement evokes two 
further requirements: (1) a legitimate and uncontroversial standard and (2) 
an explanation of precisely how the causal network account fails to meet 
this standard. Until these goods are delivered, causal networks accounts of 
ill-being will be unscathed by normativity requirements. 
5.2 We Knew It All Along 
Someone might also complain that the causal network account of ill-being 
is trivial in the following way. “Of course ill-being is the result of causal 
networks! Why would we have thought otherwise?” 
 One might say something even more detailed: the very fact that the 
causal network account is (i) intuitively plausible, (ii) implicit in scientific 
practice, (iii) inferred from various empirical findings, and it (iv) is not 
already formalized is reason to think that we have known about the causal 
network account all along, at least implicitly. If this is really what it means 
for something to be known all along, then so be it. It is not clear that that is 
a real problem for the causal network account of ill-being. 
 To illustrate, reconsider the complaint. If the causal network 
accounts of ill-being are so obvious, then it might be strange that no one has 
formalized such an account. After all, many scholars are in the business 
of—among other things—formalizing and tidying up our implicit, intuitive 
views about the world. So if a scholar provides a more formal and explicit 
version of our intuitive, implicit understanding, then they have not made an 
error. On the contrary, they have delivered the goods.  
5.3 Intuition Fitting 
Someone might also complain that causal network accounts of ill-being do 
not capture all of their intuitions about ill-being. The response to this 
complaint is simple: Satisfying every intuition is not an achievable standard. 
Further, it is not clear that satisfying every intuition is a good standard. 
Indeed, many instances of good scholarship seem to challenge the most 
common or potent intuitions. 
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 At this point, causal network accounts of ill-being seem to provide 
a coherent and compelling account of many intuitions about cases of ill-
being—e.g., Lincoln’s rumination and Jonsi’s learned helplessness.  
 A complainant might reply as follows: “But lots of philosophical 
accounts capture some of our intuitions. How is the causal network account 
any better than the other philosophical accounts?” The answer to this 
question, of course, depends on the details of the alternative accounts. 
Causal network accounts of ill-being do more than just capture our 
intuitions. They also provide philosophical, scientific, and practical utility. 
If there are competing accounts of ill-being that can deliver all of these 
goods, then the complainant’s point is well-taken. If, however, alternative 
accounts of ill-being do not deliver all of these goods, then causal network 
accounts seem to be preferable. 
5.4 Completeness 
Another complaint is that the present attempt to bolster causal network 
accounts of ill-being is incomplete. After all, this paper focuses on just a 
couple instance of ill-being: depression and digital ill-being. It does not 
catalog and account for every instance of ill-being. So it certainly does not 
follow from anything in this paper that ill-being, generally speaking, is well-
captured by causal networks. This complaint seems reasonable. 
 Still, the friend of the causal network account might hope that the 
present account, while incomplete, provides a framework for more 
complete causal network accounts of ill-being. One framework that is 
implicit in this paper can be made explicit as follows: (A) identify instances 
of ill-being and then (B) appeal to first-personal and third-personal 
observations to propose which nodes might be involved in such ill-being; 
(C) provide empirically tractable explications of these nodes and their 
relationships; (D) test correlational and causal relationships between these 
nodes; (E) once some nodes and their relationships have been discovered, 
hypothesize the causal network fragment and its implications; (F) test the 
implications of the hypothetical causal network fragment; (G) guide 
philosophical, scientific, and practical endeavors according to successful 
hypotheses about ill-being causal network fragments; (H) compare the 
causal network accounts of ill-being to competing accounts to determine 
which account delivers more utility. So while the present account does not 
constitute a complete account of ill-being, it may be instrumental in a more 
complete account.  
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6  Conclusion 
Causal network accounts of depression and digital ill-being offer a 
framework for a more complete account of ill-being. Causal network 
accounts of ill-being also provide motivation to pursue this more complete 
account: philosophical, scientific, and practical utility. Further, insofar as 
the more complete causal network account of ill-being would complement 
an existing causal network account of well-being, causal network accounts 
are instrumental to a unified and complete account of welfare, digital and 
otherwise. Insofar as the alternative accounts of ill-being cannot do all of 
this, we should prefer causal network accounts of ill-being. 
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